Files
repoctl/tests/test_adoption_gates.py
T
Alexander BaranovandClaude Opus 5 1ab02a257c fix(adopt,init): decide by evidence, refuse instead of defaulting
Running a full assess -> plan -> apply -> verify against Infra/LXD and
Infra/Docker in throwaway worktrees, and a bootstrap into a scratch
directory, surfaced the same two mistakes repeated across both commands:
a shape was read where evidence was available, and a missing answer became
a silent default rather than a refusal.

adopt:

- classify secret-shaped paths by content, not by filename. A live
  credential blocks; a file tracked against the repository's own ignore
  rules and a name-only match are warnings; findings name keys, never
  values. In Infra/Docker this turned 14 false blockers into 2 true ones
  and surfaced 14 files committed despite `**/.env`.
- carry assess findings into the plan and refuse while an error-severity
  finding is unresolved. An owner may accept one through
  `acknowledgedFindings` with a reason; the acknowledgement enters the
  plan and therefore planHash, so approval covers it.
- derive metadata.name from the git remote instead of the clone directory,
  and refuse to plan without a confirmed owner (runbook section 9).
- propose content roots from the whole content vocabulary rather than the
  winning type's markers, and recognise N sibling directories sharing a
  marker file as one file-set root with a selector, as runbook 7.2 already
  specified. Authority defaulted rather than derived now asks.

init: apply the guards adopt already had. Answers are validated against
the vocabularies that already existed in constants (name, type, lifecycle,
access) so init can no longer create a repository that fails its own
validate; owners are required; a directory that already holds the planned
paths is refused at plan time and pointed at adopt; and every path from a
plan is confined before the first byte is written -- init wrote outside
the repository from an edited plan.

validate: mask fenced blocks and inline code spans before scanning for
Markdown links. A PowerShell snippet in Infra/Docker's CLAUDE.md parsed as
a link and kept validate red for a reason unrelated to the repository.

paths: allow "." as a whole content-root path, never as a segment, so the
file-set root runbook 7.2 describes can be declared.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 18:10:59 +03:00

298 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""The gates adoption must not let through, and the evidence it must not invent.
Every case here comes from running `adopt` against two real repositories. Each
one passed before the fix and reported success on a repository that had live
credentials in git, no confirmed owner, a name taken from the clone directory,
and a contract that described almost none of its content.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from stewardship import adoption
BASE = {"README.md": "# Sample\n"}
def _owners_plan(repo, **kwargs):
assessment = adoption.assess(repo)
return adoption.build_plan(
repo, assessment, confirmed_name="sample", confirmed_owners=["platform"], **kwargs
)
def _codes(findings, code):
return [f for f in findings if f["code"] == code]
# --- 1. secret classes ------------------------------------------------------
def test_document_about_secrets_is_a_warning_not_a_blocker(synthetic_repo) -> None:
"""A document explaining a placeholder convention carries no credential."""
repo = synthetic_repo(
{
**BASE,
"docs/SECRETS.md": (
"# Secrets convention\n\n"
"Profiles carry `<SECRET:name>` tokens instead of real credentials.\n"
"The AD-join password was removed from every profile.\n"
),
}
)
findings = adoption.assess(repo)["findings"]
assert _codes(findings, "ADOPT_SECRET_NAME_SHAPED")
assert not [f for f in findings if f["severity"] == "error"]
def test_live_credential_blocks_and_never_echoes_the_value(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo(
{**BASE, "stack/.env": "TZ=Europe/Moscow\nPOSTGRES_PASSWORD=hunter2-live-value\n"}
)
findings = adoption.assess(repo)["findings"]
verified = _codes(findings, "ADOPT_SECRET_CONTENT_VERIFIED")
assert [f["severity"] for f in verified] == ["error"]
assert "POSTGRES_PASSWORD" in verified[0]["message"]
# Invariant: a scanner that leaks what it found is worse than none.
assert "hunter2-live-value" not in verified[0]["message"]
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("line", "is_credential"),
[
("AIRFLOW_FERNET_KEY=Rabc123XYZ", True),
("OLLAMA_API_KEY=sk-live-1", True),
("DB_PASSPHRASE=s3kr3t", True),
# "KEY" as a bare substring cannot tell a credential from a file path.
("SSH_KEY_PATH=/home/u/.ssh/id", False),
("KEYBOARD_LAYOUT=us", False),
("BYPASS_CACHE=true", False),
("PASSENGER_ROOT=/x", False),
("TZ=Europe/Moscow", False),
# Placeholders, in the three shapes real repositories use.
("POSTGRES_PASSWORD=changeme", False),
("DB_PASSWORD=<SECRET:db>", False),
("API_TOKEN=${API_TOKEN}", False),
],
)
def test_key_pattern_precision(tmp_path: Path, line: str, is_credential: bool) -> None:
"""Which key names count, and which values read as placeholders.
Exercised against the content check directly: this is a pure decision about
a single line, and building a git repository per case bought only runtime.
"""
env = tmp_path / ".env"
env.write_text(line + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
assert bool(adoption._secret_content_evidence(env)) is is_credential
def test_pem_private_key_is_content_evidence(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo(
{**BASE, "certs/server.key": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nAAAA\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"}
)
findings = adoption.assess(repo)["findings"]
assert _codes(findings, "ADOPT_SECRET_CONTENT_VERIFIED")
def test_file_committed_against_its_own_ignore_rule_is_reported(synthetic_repo) -> None:
"""The fact worth reporting most, and the one the filename check missed."""
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE, ".gitignore": "**/.env\n", "stack/.env": "TZ=Europe/Moscow\n"}, git=False)
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=repo, check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "t@example.com"], cwd=repo, check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "T"], cwd=repo, check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "add", "-A", "-f"], cwd=repo, check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-q", "-m", "base"], cwd=repo, check=True)
findings = adoption.assess(repo)["findings"]
contradiction = _codes(findings, "ADOPT_SECRET_IGNORED_BUT_TRACKED")
assert [f["path"] for f in contradiction] == ["stack/.env"]
assert contradiction[0]["severity"] == "warning"
# --- 2. plan inherits findings and refuses on unresolved blockers -----------
def test_plan_refuses_while_an_assess_blocker_is_unresolved(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE, "stack/.env": "POSTGRES_PASSWORD=hunter2-live-value\n"})
with pytest.raises(adoption.AdoptionError) as excinfo:
_owners_plan(repo)
assert excinfo.value.code == "ADOPT_ASSESS_BLOCKERS_UNRESOLVED"
def test_acknowledgement_unblocks_and_is_recorded_in_the_plan(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE, "stack/.env": "POSTGRES_PASSWORD=hunter2-live-value\n"})
plan = _owners_plan(
repo,
acknowledged=[
{
"code": "ADOPT_SECRET_CONTENT_VERIFIED",
"path": "stack/.env",
"reason": "rotation scheduled",
}
],
)
assert plan["acknowledgedFindings"][0]["reason"] == "rotation scheduled"
assert any(f["code"] == "ADOPT_SECRET_CONTENT_VERIFIED" for f in plan["findings"])
def test_acknowledgement_changes_the_plan_hash(synthetic_repo) -> None:
"""Approval must cover the acknowledgement, not just the file changes."""
plain = synthetic_repo({**BASE}, name="plain")
without = _owners_plan(plain)
with_ack = _owners_plan(
plain, acknowledged=[{"code": "ADOPT_WORKTREE_DIRTY", "reason": "known"}]
)
assert without["planHash"] != with_ack["planHash"]
def test_acknowledgement_without_a_reason_is_refused(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE})
with pytest.raises(adoption.AdoptionError) as excinfo:
_owners_plan(repo, acknowledged=[{"code": "ADOPT_SECRET_CONTENT_VERIFIED", "reason": " "}])
assert excinfo.value.code == "ADOPT_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT_INCOMPLETE"
def test_plan_carries_the_assessment_findings(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE, "docs/guide.md": "# G\n"})
plan = _owners_plan(repo)
assert any(f["code"] == "ADOPT_SOURCE_MIRROR_AMBIGUOUS" for f in plan["findings"])
# The plan's own answer settles this one, so it must not travel onward.
assert not any(f["code"] == "ADOPT_OWNER_UNKNOWN" for f in plan["findings"])
# --- 3. identity and owners -------------------------------------------------
def test_plan_refuses_without_confirmed_owners(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE})
assessment = adoption.assess(repo)
with pytest.raises(adoption.AdoptionError) as excinfo:
adoption.build_plan(repo, assessment, confirmed_name="sample", confirmed_owners=[])
assert excinfo.value.code == "ADOPT_OWNER_UNKNOWN"
def test_name_comes_from_the_remote_keeping_its_namespace(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE}, name="whatever-this-clone-is-called")
subprocess.run(
["git", "remote", "add", "origin", "ssh://git@example.com:9922/corsus-it/OpTools/LXD.git"],
cwd=repo,
check=True,
)
identity = adoption.assess(repo)["identity"]
assert identity == {"name": "optools-lxd", "source": "git-remote"}
def test_scp_style_remote_is_understood(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE}, name="clone")
subprocess.run(["git", "remote", "add", "origin", "git@example.com:group/Repo.git"], cwd=repo, check=True)
assert adoption.assess(repo)["identity"]["name"] == "group-repo"
def test_directory_fallback_says_it_was_inferred(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE}, name="fallback-repo")
assessment = adoption.assess(repo)
assert assessment["identity"] == {"name": "fallback-repo", "source": "directory"}
assert _codes(assessment["findings"], "ADOPT_NAME_INFERRED")
# --- 4. content roots -------------------------------------------------------
def test_docs_is_proposed_for_an_infrastructure_repository(synthetic_repo) -> None:
"""`docs` is listed as evidence for `project`, which used to hide it here."""
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE, "profiles-source/a.yaml": "{}\n", "docs/guide.md": "# G\n"})
assessment = adoption.assess(repo)
assert assessment["classification"]["proposedType"] == "infrastructure-config"
assert "docs" in {cr["path"] for cr in assessment["proposedContentRoots"]}
def test_sibling_stacks_become_one_file_set_root(synthetic_repo) -> None:
files = {**BASE}
for stack in ("grafana", "loki", "n8n"):
files[f"{stack}/compose.yaml"] = "services: {}\n"
repo = synthetic_repo(files)
roots = adoption.assess(repo)["proposedContentRoots"]
stacks = [cr for cr in roots if cr.get("kind") == "file-set"]
assert len(stacks) == 1
assert stacks[0]["path"] == "." and stacks[0]["selector"] == "*/compose.y*ml"
def test_two_siblings_are_not_a_repeated_shape(synthetic_repo) -> None:
files = {**BASE}
for stack in ("grafana", "loki"):
files[f"{stack}/compose.yaml"] = "services: {}\n"
repo = synthetic_repo(files)
assert not [cr for cr in adoption.assess(repo)["proposedContentRoots"] if cr.get("kind") == "file-set"]
def test_file_set_root_does_not_forbid_the_whole_repository(synthetic_repo) -> None:
files = {**BASE}
for stack in ("grafana", "loki", "n8n"):
files[f"{stack}/compose.yaml"] = "services: {}\n"
repo = synthetic_repo(files)
plan = _owners_plan(repo)
assert "./**" not in plan["forbiddenChanges"]
assert "*/compose.y*ml" in plan["forbiddenChanges"]
# The plan must still be able to write what it authors.
written = {c["path"] for c in plan["changes"] if c["action"] == "create"}
assert not any(adoption.is_forbidden(path, plan["forbiddenChanges"]) for path in written)
def test_defaulted_authority_asks_instead_of_asserting(synthetic_repo) -> None:
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE, "docs/guide.md": "# G\n"})
assessment = adoption.assess(repo)
assert _codes(assessment["findings"], "ADOPT_SOURCE_MIRROR_AMBIGUOUS")
def test_evidenced_mirror_is_not_ambiguous(synthetic_repo) -> None:
"""`profiles` paired with `profiles-source` is derived, not defaulted."""
repo = synthetic_repo({**BASE, "profiles/a.yaml": "{}\n", "profiles-source/a.yaml": "{}\n"})
assessment = adoption.assess(repo)
mirror = next(cr for cr in assessment["proposedContentRoots"] if cr["path"] == "profiles")
assert mirror["authority"] == "mirror"
ambiguous = {f["path"] for f in _codes(assessment["findings"], "ADOPT_SOURCE_MIRROR_AMBIGUOUS")}
assert "profiles" not in ambiguous
# --- 5. markdown links are not found inside code ----------------------------
def test_link_shaped_code_is_not_a_link(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
from stewardship.markdown import check_markdown_file
(tmp_path / "CLAUDE.md").write_text(
"# Doc\n\n"
"Cast explicitly: `[string]([IO.File]::ReadAllText($path))`.\n\n"
"```powershell\n"
"see [also](nowhere/missing.md)\n"
"```\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
assert check_markdown_file(tmp_path, "CLAUDE.md") == []
def test_a_real_broken_link_is_still_reported(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
from stewardship.markdown import check_markdown_file
(tmp_path / "CLAUDE.md").write_text("# Doc\n\nSee [x](docs/missing.md).\n", encoding="utf-8")
codes = [f.code for f in check_markdown_file(tmp_path, "CLAUDE.md")]
assert codes == ["MARKDOWN_LINK_TARGET_MISSING"]
# --- path confinement: "." is a whole path, never a segment ------------------
def test_repository_root_is_a_legal_content_root_path() -> None:
from stewardship.paths import normalize_resource_path
assert normalize_resource_path(".", allow_root=True) == "."
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("value", "allow_root"),
[(".", False), ("a/./b", True), ("../escape", True), ("a/../..", True)],
)
def test_dot_segments_stay_rejected(value: str, allow_root: bool) -> None:
from stewardship.paths import PathViolation, normalize_resource_path
with pytest.raises(PathViolation):
normalize_resource_path(value, allow_root=allow_root)